The Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal, in its decision of 25 March 2026 (First Chamber, claim no. 5861/2025, extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion), lays down criterion on a procedural question with daily impact on the defence against the tax Administration. A notification made by the Administration at the contributor’s tax domicile in the framework of an ex officio procedure is valid even where the contributor has designated a representative with a domicile for notifications, provided the notification meets its proper purpose and has reached the addressee’s effective knowledge.

It is helpful to begin with the legislative framework, because the question articulates several provisions whose interaction is not always clearly read.

Article 110.2 of the General Tax Act (LGT) governs the place of notifications in ex officio procedures. The rule allows the Administration to make the notification, alternatively, at the tax domicile of the contributor or his or her representative, at the workplace, at the place where the economic activity is carried out or at any other place suitable for that purpose. The conjunction or —and not and— has traditionally been read by the Administration as an authorisation to choose among the different statutorily provided places.

Article 111 of the LGT, for its part, governs the persons entitled to receive notifications. Where the notification is made at the place designated for that purpose or at the tax domicile of the contributor or of his or her representative, any person who is at that place and identifies him or herself may receive the notification.

The case under review reflects the usual profile of the litigation. Mr X was subject to a limited-scope inspection procedure concerning personal income tax for 2019. In the course of the procedure, he designated a voluntary representative —Mr L— with a domicile on a different avenue from his tax domicile and for notification purposes. After the signing of a disagreement record, AEAT notified the assessment decision on 21 May 2024 at Mr X’s tax domicile, where a family member signed the acknowledgement of receipt.

Mr X filed a reconsideration request on 22 June 2024 —one day after the one-month period counted from the notification—. AEAT rejected the request as out of time, computing the period from 21 May. Against that rejection, Mr X filed a claim with the Regional Economic-Administrative Tribunal of Madrid alleging two things: that the notification was not valid because it had not been made at the designated representative’s domicile, and that he had only had effective knowledge of the assessment on 24 May —when the family member handed him the documentation—.

The TEAR of Madrid partially upheld the claim, annulled the rejection and ordered the proceedings to be remitted. Its reasoning relied on the judgment of the High Court of Justice of Madrid 487/2022 of 10 May 2024, which had concluded that, where a representative is designated with a domicile for notifications, the Administration had to notify at that domicile and not at the contributor’s, on pain of invalidity of the notification.

Against that decision, the Director of AEAT’s Department of Financial and Tax Inspection brought the extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion. Her argument was based on the historic case law of the Spanish Supreme Court —in particular, the STS of 7 October 2015 (cassation appeal 680/2014), under which, in ex officio procedures, the choice of place of notification corresponds to the Administration without being subject to a precedence order— and on the TEAC’s own doctrine in its decision of 25 February 2016 (RG 5833/2015).

The TEAC, in the decision discussed, partially upholds the AEAT appeal and lays down criterion favourable to the administrative position, although with a nuance worth retaining.

The Central Tribunal’s reasoning is articulated on three pillars.

First, the TEAC examines the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 1 July 2025 (cassation appeal 3905/2023), implicitly invoked by the TEAR. That judgment laid down as doctrine of cassational interest that, in procedures initiated ex officio or on a party’s request, “the tax Administration must make notifications by the appropriate or mandatory channel, at the domicile expressly designated by the contributor or his or her legal representative, especially where the right to defence depends on it”.

The TEAC qualifies the reading. The doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court must not be detached from the factual context in which it was issued: the High Court found that, in that case, the contributor’s “right to defence had been conditioned”. Where that material affectation of the right to defence does not concur, the operative rule may be different.

Second, the TEAC resorts to a historic doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court on the scope of purpose achieved in matters of notifications. The judgments of 5 and 26 May 2011 (cassation appeals 5671/2008 and 5423/2008) established that what the interested party must prove is that the act did not reach him or her in time to react against it. If he or she had knowledge of the act, even through a third party, when there was still sufficient time to challenge it, he or she is bound to do so. The time limit for challenge is not counted from the moment the third party materially delivers the notification.

Third, the TEAC relies on article 111 of the LGT. The rule expressly allows the notification to be received by any person present at the contributor’s tax domicile who identifies him or herself. The legal order rests, in that case, on a presumption of transmission: the proximity evidenced by presence at the same domicile is sufficient to consider that the notification will reach the addressee and will be deemed made with him or her, even if physically received by another person.

Applied to the case under review, the TEAC concludes that the failure to notify at the designated representative’s domicile constitutes a mere non-invalidating irregularity, to the extent that the notification met its proper purpose: the assessment decision reached the contributor’s effective knowledge in sufficient time to react.

For the purposes of computing the dies a quo of the time limit for challenge, the relevant date is that of the notification at the tax domicile —21 May 2024—, not that of the moment in which the family member physically delivered the documentation to the contributor. The reconsideration request filed on 22 June was therefore out of time.

The criterion laid down, with unifying effect, is the following: “The validity of the notification being ultimately conditioned on its having met its proper purpose, a notification of the decision concluding an ex officio procedure made by the Administration at the contributor’s tax domicile is valid where any person present at that domicile and identifying him or herself receives it (art. 111 LGT), without the fact that the notification has not been attempted at the domicile of the representative designated by the contributor necessarily entailing the invalidity of the notification made”.

In our view, the doctrine of the TEAC offers a defensible technical reading, although it leaves the contributor in a more demanding position than the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court of 1 July 2025. The operative key shifts from the place of notification to the contributor’s effective knowledge within a useful period. That rule has systemic sense —it prevents the contributor from sheltering behind formalisms when he or she has had an opportunity to react— but it also leaves an interpretive margin to the Administration that warrants defensive coverage.

Subject to the foregoing, the doctrine signals two operative caveats.

First: the TEAC’s criterion operates save where the conditioning of the right to defence is evidenced. If the contributor can demonstrate that the notification did not reach him or her in time to react —because the third party was absent, because he or she delivered the documentation with material delay, because the contributor was abroad— the doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court of 1 July 2025 could be asserted in contentious-administrative proceedings.

Second: the doctrine does not neutralise the designation of a representative. What the TEAC holds is that the notification at the tax domicile, in these circumstances, is not void by the mere fact of having a designated representative. But the designation itself produces effects in the proceedings —standing, internal communications, technical assistance— that should be preserved.

The practical consequence is clear for the contributor and his or her representative.

It is advisable, first, to organise material reception at the tax domicile where a representative has been designated. If family members, employees or other persons may receive notifications by inertia at the tax domicile, there is a risk that the time limit may begin to run without the contributor —or his or her adviser— having timely knowledge.

It is advisable, second, to communicate to the representative immediately any notification received at the tax domicile. The traceability of that transmission —email, internal messaging, dated record— is the best evidence if, in due course, a defence-conditioning argument is to be put forward.

It is advisable, third, to consider the use of electronic means. Mandatory electronic notification —where applicable— and warnings via DEHú, addressed to the interested party or to an authorised social collaborator, considerably simplify traceability and reduce the risk of silent computation of the period.

In conclusion, what this new decision of the Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal makes clear is that the designation of a representative with a domicile for notifications does not automatically render invalid the notification made at the contributor’s tax domicile in an ex officio procedure: if the notification meets its proper purpose —reaches the contributor’s effective knowledge within a useful period—, it operates in full and the dies a quo of the time limit for challenge is counted from the date of the notification, not from the material delivery by the third party.

Sources

  • Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal, First Chamber, decision of 25 March 2026, extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion no. 00/05861/2025/00/00: serviciostelematicosext.hacienda.gob.es.
  • Spanish Supreme Court, Contentious-Administrative Chamber, judgment of 1 July 2025, cassation appeal no. 3905/2023: poderjudicial.es.
  • Spanish Supreme Court, Contentious-Administrative Chamber, judgment of 7 October 2015, cassation appeal no. 680/2014.
  • Spanish Supreme Court, Contentious-Administrative Chamber, judgments of 5 and 26 May 2011 (cassation appeals 5671/2008 and 5423/2008).