<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Tax procedure on Spanish Tax Journal — Álvaro Crespo García</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/categories/tax-procedure/</link><description>Recent content in Tax procedure on Spanish Tax Journal — Álvaro Crespo García</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-US</language><atom:link href="https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/categories/tax-procedure/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Home entry under article 113 of the LGT: the judicial order must individually motivate digital access</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/05-05/nota-home-entry-art-113-lgt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/05-05/nota-home-entry-art-113-lgt/</guid><description>The Spanish Supreme Court confirms that the judicial authorisation of home entry under article 113 of the LGT must specifically motivate access to digital repositories —emails, servers, cloud— that affect other rights of article 18 of the Spanish Constitution.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Spanish Supreme Court, in its judgment no. 1122/2024 of 25 June 2024 (cassation appeal 7845/2022), confirms —and the doctrine is consolidated in subsequent pronouncements— that the judicial authorisation of entry into the taxpayer&rsquo;s home under article 113 of the General Tax Act (LGT) requires specific and individualised reasoning. That reasoning is not exhausted in the generic authorisation to enter the physical home: where the entry is projected over digital repositories —emails, servers, data stored in the cloud— that affect other rights of article 18 of the Spanish Constitution (secrecy of communications, informational privacy), the judicial order must autonomously motivate the purpose, necessity and proportionality of access to each one of them. The generic authorisation of the physical home does not, by itself, legitimise the massive imaging of digital information.</p>
<p>The practical consequence, for defensive purposes, is operative. Where AEAT seeks authorisation to enter the taxpayer&rsquo;s home, it is advisable to examine in detail the scope of the judicial order granted and, where applicable, to formulate opposition to those aspects whose specific reasoning is conspicuously absent. During the action itself, it is also advisable to preserve a rigorous documentary trail —copy of the order, record of the entry, identification of the devices on which the action took place, scope of the imaging carried out, reservations made at the time—. That documentation is the basis of any subsequent challenge, both for defect of motivation of the order and for excess in the scope of the administrative action.</p>
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<p><strong>Full analysis in →</strong> <a href="/en/2026/05-05/home-entry-art-113-lgt-digital-access/">The right to deny the tax Administration entry into the home: the specific reasoning of the judicial order also reaches digital access</a></p>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>The right to deny the tax Administration entry into the home: the specific reasoning of the judicial order also reaches digital access</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/05-05/home-entry-art-113-lgt-digital-access/</link><pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/05-05/home-entry-art-113-lgt-digital-access/</guid><description>The Spanish Supreme Court confirms that the judicial authorisation of entry into the home under article 113 of the General Tax Act (LGT) requires specific and individualised reasoning, also where it is projected onto digital repositories (emails, servers, cloud storage) that affect other rights under article 18 of the Spanish Constitution.</description></item><item><title>Notification at the tax domicile despite the designation of a representative: the TEAC consolidates the rule of purpose achieved</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-25/nota-teac-notification-purpose-achieved/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-25/nota-teac-notification-purpose-achieved/</guid><description>The TEAC confirms that the notification made at the contributor&amp;#39;s tax domicile, despite the designation of a representative with a domicile for notifications, is valid if it reaches the effective knowledge of the interested party within a useful period.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal (TEAC), in its decision of 25 March 2026 (extraordinary appeal for unification of criterion no. 5861/2025), confirms that a tax notification made at the contributor&rsquo;s tax domicile, despite the prior designation of a representative with a domicile for notifications, is not automatically invalid in an <em>ex officio</em> procedure. If the notification meets its proper purpose —reaching the contributor&rsquo;s effective knowledge within a useful period—, it operates in full. The <em>dies a quo</em> of the time limit to appeal is counted from the date of the notification, not from the material delivery by the third party. The doctrine qualifies the Spanish Supreme Court&rsquo;s criterion (judgments of 7 October 2015 and of 1 July 2025) under the rule of purpose achieved.</p>
<p>The practical consequence, for defensive purposes, matters especially in inspection or management procedures initiated <em>ex officio</em>. The designation of a representative does not shield the contributor against a silent computation of the time limit if the notification meets its communicative function. It is advisable to maintain traceability of the communications received at the tax domicile and at the representative&rsquo;s domicile, articulate an internal reception protocol that minimises the risk of the notification being left unprocessed and, where applicable, formalise the designation of the representative with the greatest possible clarity so that the acting body attends to it. The difference between preserving the time limit to appeal intact or exhausting it without reaction may depend, in practice, on that internal protocol.</p>
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<p><strong>Full analysis in →</strong> <a href="/en/2026/03-25/teac-tax-notification-domicile-representative-effective-knowledge/">Tax notification at the tax domicile despite the designation of a representative: the TEAC qualifies the Spanish Supreme Court&rsquo;s doctrine under the rule of purpose achieved</a></p>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Tax notification at the tax domicile despite the designation of a representative: the TEAC qualifies the Spanish Supreme Court's doctrine under the rule of purpose achieved</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-25/teac-tax-notification-domicile-representative-effective-knowledge/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-25/teac-tax-notification-domicile-representative-effective-knowledge/</guid><description>The TEAC, in its decision of 25 March 2026 (unification of criterion), considers valid the notification made at the contributor&amp;#39;s tax domicile even where a representative has been designated, provided the notification meets its proper purpose.</description></item><item><title>A self-assessment may not be the subject of the special review procedure for acts that are null and void</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-11/self-assessment-not-administrative-act-review/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-11/self-assessment-not-administrative-act-review/</guid><description>The Spanish Supreme Court confirms that self-assessments are not administrative acts and may not be subject to the review procedure for null acts of article 217 of the General Tax Act (LGT).</description></item><item><title>Tax self-assessment: rectification under article 120.3 of the LGT as the ordinary review channel</title><link>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-11/nota-self-assessment-not-administrative-act/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://spanishtaxjournal.com/en/2026/03-11/nota-self-assessment-not-administrative-act/</guid><description>The Spanish Supreme Court confirms that a tax self-assessment is not an administrative act. The ordinary review channel where it is considered contrary to law is the rectification of article 120.3 of the LGT, exercised within the four-year statute of limitations.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Spanish Supreme Court, in its judgment no. 350/2026 of 20 March 2026 (cassation appeal 422/2024), confirms that a tax self-assessment does not constitute an administrative act in the proper sense, but an action of the taxpayer subject to a procedural regime of its own. The consequence is direct: where the self-assessment is considered contrary to law —typically, by application of a rule whose unconstitutionality or incompatibility with EU law is declared subsequently— the review channel available is the rectification of article 120.3 of the General Tax Act (LGT), exercised within the ordinary four-year statute of limitations. The extraordinary route of nullity <em>ex tunc</em> of article 217 of the LGT does not apply to self-assessments and, therefore, does not open a second procedural chance once that period has elapsed.</p>
<p>The practical consequence, for defensive purposes, requires time discipline. Where a judgment of the Constitutional Court or of the Court of Justice of the European Union declares the unconstitutionality or incompatibility of a rule under which tax has been self-assessed, it is advisable to react within the four-year statute of limitations. The available options are, in essence, two: to seek rectification of the self-assessment under article 120.3 of the LGT and, where applicable, to articulate in parallel a State liability claim against the legislator, a route the legal order keeps open in delimited situations and with its own time limits. To wait beyond the statute of limitations amounts, in most cases, to renouncing recovery.</p>
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<p><strong>Full analysis in →</strong> <a href="/en/2026/03-11/self-assessment-not-administrative-act-review/">A self-assessment may not be the subject of the special review procedure for acts that are null and void</a></p>
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